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Abstract
The Java programming language has been widely described as secure by design. Nevertheless, a number of
serious security vulnerabilities have been discovered in Java, particularly in the Bytecode Veriﬁer, a critical
component used to verify class semantics before loading is complete. This paper describes a method for
representing Java security constraints using the Alloy modeling language. It further describes a system
for performing a security analysis on any block of Java bytecodes by converting the bytes into relation
initializers in Alloy. Any counterexamples found by the Alloy analyzer correspond directly to insecure
code. Analysis of the approach in the context of known security exploits is provided. This type of analysis
represents a signiﬁcant departure from standard malware analysis methods based on signatures or anomaly
detection.
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1 Introduction
This paper will describe an analysis tool for verifying security constraints within
Java bytecodes. This investigation was motivated by the continued appearance of
malicious Java code that violates the security constraints imposed by the Java com-
piler, the Java Bytecode Veriﬁer and the Java runtime. The analysis approach is
based on the lightweight modeling language Alloy [1], [2]. This paper will describe
the security veriﬁcation approach taken by the Java Virtual Machine (JVM), and
brieﬂy enumerate some of the ways that it has been circumvented. This will be
followed by a description of the design of the analysis tool and its implementation.
Particular emphasis will be given to describing the Bytecode Veriﬁer security con-
straints and the degree to which they are checked by the current model. The work
described in this paper is a signiﬁcant extension of [3]. Finally, a path toward fu-
ture work will be described. The analysis tool has, in fact, proven to be a powerful
approach to analyzing JVM security constraints, as it is capable of detecting several
forms of malicious bytecodes.
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1.1 Background
The Java programming language has been touted as “secure by design” since its
inception. However, attacks against Java security have been promulgated from the
earliest days of Java. Felten discovered several weaknesses in the Java security
model almost immediately, and his work on Java [4] contains an extensive list of
early exploits. The development of Java malware has continued unabated up to
the present. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project [5] lists numerous
Java bugs that can lead to privilege escalation, exﬁltration of sensitive data, denial
of service and other malicious outcomes. A recent announcement (November 2009)
contained more than ninety previously unpublished Java vulnerabilities.
In order to understand how these security failures come about, it is ﬁrst necessary
to brieﬂy review the Java security model. Java security is enforced in three ways.
The Java compiler has a large number of rules that it enforces in order to ensure
that the syntax and semantics of the Java language are satisﬁed, but also to prohibit
certain actions that are known to be associated with malicious code. For example,
the Java compiler will refuse to compile any program that contains a method that
makes use of an uninitialized variable. The output of the Java compiler is a binary
ﬁle known as a classﬁle. In order for a Java application or applet to use the methods
provided by a class, it must load the classﬁle that contains that class into the Java
execution environment. Loading is accomplished by a Java classloader. Whenever a
class is loaded the Java Bytecode Veriﬁer is invoked. The Bytecode Veriﬁer checks
that the contents of the classﬁle conform to the classﬁle format and also veriﬁes a
large number of security constraints before it will allow the classloader to complete
loading of that classﬁle. Finally, the Java runtime performs array bounds checking,
runtime type conversion checking and a number of other tests.
Almost all Java exploits to date have used weaknesses in the Bytecode Veriﬁer.
The Bytecode Veriﬁer’s rules are described in great detail in the JVM speciﬁcation
[8]. The Bytecode Veriﬁer uses a constraint based approach in performing its anal-
ysis. For example, it checks that all local variables are written before being read,
that each instruction receives precisely the set of operands that it is expecting, that
the stack has the same depth at each program point regardless of execution path
used to reach that program point, and many other constraints.
Our approach uses Alloy to perform constraint analysis on Java bytecodes. It
attempts to emulate the constraint checking that is ostensibly being performed by
the Bytecode Veriﬁer. In Alloy it is very easy to express constraints in terms of
formulas involving relations, and therefore it has proven to be a rich environment for
checking Java security constraints. Previous eﬀorts have been made to apply formal
m e t h o d st oJ a v ab y t e c o d e s[ 9], [10], [11], among others, but these eﬀorts have used
a more heavyweight model checking approach that attempts to prove soundness, as
opposed to Alloy’s lightweight constraint based approach that converts assertions
into Boolean formulas and then searches for satisfaction assignments or the existence
of counterexamples.
Several of the security constraints imposed by the JVM have already been men-
tioned. In general, we would like to focus on “high value” constraints. A constraint
is said to be high value if known malware violates that constraint. Thus, this paper
will focus on constraints associated with access to uninitialized or out-of-bounds
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memory, as well as constraints associated with instruction transfer and method res-
olution. In order to create an extensible model for the operation of the Bytecode
Veriﬁer, a general framework for code analysis was created such that adding addi-
tional constraints would involve only incremental modiﬁcations, and not a complete
restructuring of the model code. The current implementation concretely models
several high value security constraints, as will be described below. The work to
date strongly suggests that the current implementation can be readily adapted to
additional constraints.
2D e s i g n
Alloy is a lightweight modeling language that uses ﬁrst order logic. Alloy is capable
of analyzing assertions for satisﬁability and also for the existence of counterexam-
ples. A key observation is that the security constraints imposed by the JVM can
be modeled as invariants, and thus can be analyzed by the Alloy Analyzer. Alloy
is not a proof system, so the failure to ﬁnd a counterexample to a constraint is not
a proof that that constraint is always satisﬁed, only that the constraint is satisﬁed
within the search space speciﬁed. If a counterexample is found, however, that does
indicate that the invariant has been violated, and the Alloy Analyzer conveniently
provides a graphical representation of that counterexample.
In the approach taken so far, the Alloy model is realized as a template containing
a ﬁxed set of relations, functions, facts, predicates and assertions. This model is
then supplemented by relation initializers that are derived from particular JVM
code. In this approach, the template portion of the Alloy model is completely
independent of any choice of Java bytecodes, while the initializers depend only
weakly on the detailed implementation of the template. Speciﬁcally, the initializers
being generated only depend on the set of relations being initialized, and not on
any speciﬁc way in which the constraints were realized in the model template. This
decoupling between the “data” portion of the model and the “code” portion of the
model makes it easy to extend with additional constraints. The model template
can be further reﬁned into three subcomponents: (1) the relation deﬁnitions; (2)
the execution engine; and (3) the constraint assertions. The relation deﬁnitions
are Alloy deﬁnitions of the top level signatures, as well as the deﬁnitions of the
relations themselves. These relation deﬁnitions capture the static properties of
JVM instructions, methods and classes, as well as capturing the JVM state as the
execution engine executes. All other components of the Alloy model are logically
dependent on the relation deﬁnitions.
The relation initializers are the initial values of the Alloy relations. They are
generated from speciﬁc JVM code. Relation initializers need to be generated from
one or more speciﬁed Java methods. Therefore, there needs to be an automatic way
of converting the Java bytecodes in a set of methods into these relation initializers.
To this end, a Java classﬁle parser was created to perform this conversion. The
parser takes a Java classﬁle as input and produces an Alloy model fragment as
output. When the model fragment is combined with the Alloy template, a complete
Alloy model is produced, as is shown in Figure 1.
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The relation deﬁnitions and their initializers form a static representation of a
set of properties of the Java methods being analyzed. In order to observe dynamic
behavior, this static representation needed to be extended with model actions that
would mimic the execution of the JVM itself, at least to the extent that the JVM’s
Bytecode Veriﬁer synthetically executes method code in order to perform its con-
straint checking. Thus, an execution engine was needed. This execution engine
represents the ﬂow of execution through the medium of stateful relations. Alloy’s
“ordering” utility is used for representing this state. Execution could not be un-
bounded, of course, since Alloy only performs analysis over a ﬁnite set of states. It
would have been possible to simply let Alloy “fall oﬀ the end” of execution, which is
to say to allow the analyzer to perform an exhaustive analysis of all possible states
in the state space. For both performance and structural reasons this was deemed
to be an unacceptable solution. Therefore, the execution engine was designed such
that certain JVM instructions are designated as terminal instructions. The execu-
tion engine was then implemented to recognize this condition and act on it so as
to not create further unique states. Of course, this models the actual execution
of the JVM itself. Certain instructions within a method are, in fact, terminal, in
that they cause the method to be exited. One obvious question is the manner in
which iterative constructs are handled by the execution engine. Would it provide
better model ﬁdelity to have the execution engine attempt to exactly mimic runtime
execution, or would this lead to unacceptable performance penalties? In fact, the
execution engine does not attempt to perform any branch prediction analysis in the
model. The precise way in which this was handled, and its implications, will be
explained in the Implementation section below.
Finally, the model must provide for a way in which each JVM security constraint
is actually checked by Alloy. Formulating the security constraints as Alloy assertions
proved to be straightforward once the model had been constructed to accurately
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reﬂect the static and dynamic properties of the method code.
3 Implementation
The implementation of the JVM security constraints analyzer will now be described.
First, the three components of the model template, namely the relation deﬁnitions,
the execution engine, and the security constraint assertions, will be described. This
will be done in parallel with descriptions of the ways in which malicious code would
violate the constraints. The implementation of the Class2Alloy classﬁle parser which
is used to generate the relation initializers will then be discussed.
3.1 Model Template
The model template employs ﬁve top level signatures, the Global signature, the Clazz
signature, the Method signature, the Instruction signature and the State signature.
The Global signature is a container for top level constants used in the various
constraints. The Clazz, Method and Instruction signatures are used to represent
the properties of the Java classes, methods and instructions that are being modeled.
Each of these three signatures is made abstract in order that each of the individual
classes, methods and instructions that make up the bytecodes being analyzed can be
deﬁned as concrete, atomic extensions of these abstract signatures. Intuitively this
is reasonable because the properties (relations) of instructions (for example) vary
from instruction to instruction, but are still static for any particular instruction.
For example, the length of a given instruction in bytes is ﬁxed for all time once
the instruction is speciﬁed, but obviously varies between instructions. The State
signature is derived from Alloy’s ordering utility, which predeﬁnes certain relations
such as ﬁrst, next and last.T h e State signature is dynamic, and the values of its
relations are updated by the execution engine as it executes during analysis. The
Alloy deﬁnition of the four primary signatures is shown below.
abstract sig Instruction {
map: Int, // offset of this instruction in bytes
term: lone Int, // is this a terminal instruction?
r: set Int, // local variables read
w: set Int, // local variables written
ubt: lone Int, // unconditional branch targets (goto)
cbt: set Int, // conditional branch targets
jsr: lone Int, // unconditional branch target (jsr)
iv: lone Int, // invokevirtual target
inm: Method, // containing method
smod: Int, // bytes pushed/popped onto stack
len: Int } // byte length of this instruction
abstract sig Method {
framelen: Int, // number of loc vars avail for use
cpindex: Int, // index in constant pool of method
ordinal: Int, // unique identifier
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acc: set Int, // access modifiers, e.g. protected
incl: Clazz } // class of this method
abstract sig Clazz {
cordinal: Int, // unique identifier
parent: lone Clazz } // parent class or {} if Object
one sig JLO extends Clazz {} { no parent }
sig State {
meth: Method, // currently executing method
prog: Instruction, // currently executing instruction
readers: set Int, // set of local vars read
writers: set Int, // set of local vars written
depth: Int } // stack depth
An Alloy model is deﬁned by its relations, so a careful description of each of the
relations shown above will serve to illuminate the rest of the implementation. The
Instruction signature is the basic unit of execution. As new states are synthesized by
the execution engine, the current instruction advances and the currently executing
method may change as well. In the Instruction signature the map relation deﬁnes
the byte oﬀset of the instruction from the beginning of the method (or other block
of code) being analyzed; it is an integer. The term relation is a set of integers that
is either empty, or contains a single value. If the set is nonempty and contains the
value 1, then the instruction is a terminal instruction: it causes the execution engine
to cease creating new states. The r and w relations model the sets of local variables
read or written by the instruction, respectively. It is quite possible for an instruction
to access more than one local variable, so these relations must be modeled as sets
of integers. (The JVM itself also describes local variables in terms of integers.) The
ubt and jsr relations name possible unconditional branch targets for the instruction,
either as the result of a goto or a jsr, respectively. Most instructions do not have
such targets, so the values of these relations is usually the empty set. An instruction
can have at most one such target. If a ubt target exists, it is speciﬁed as a byte
oﬀset from the beginning of the method or code block, which is identical to the
manner in which it is encoded in a classﬁle. If, however, a jsr target exists, it is
speciﬁed as a relative byte oﬀset from the current instruction. The cbt relation
names a possible conditional branch target as an absolute address. Conditional
branch targets occur with conditional instructions. An unconditional branch target
represents a transfer of control that must be executed, while a conditional branch
target represents one that might be executed. The iv target represents the argument
for an invokevirtual instruction. This instruction is used in method resolution,
using an algorithm that will be described in more detail below. The argument is an
index into the constant pool of the current class; it is expected that this constant
will contain a method reference. The smod relation models the number of bytes
that the instruction modiﬁes on the method stack. This can be a positive integer
(item(s) are pushed onto the stack), a negative integer (item(s) are popped oﬀ the
stack) or zero. The inm relation captures the method containing the instruction
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in question. Finally, the len relation models the length of the instruction in bytes.
Note that len and map contain redundant information, in that it should always
be the case that next.map = current.map + current.len. This redundancy was
introduced deliberately as an additional way of validating the internal consistency
of the model.
The Method signature is used to describe the properties of a method. It contains
a relation that indicate the size of its frame (framelen) which, in the JVM, is the
total number of local variables that method is permitted to address. It also contains
relations that gives its constant pool index (cpindex), unique ordinal (ordinal)a n d
a relation that holds its containing class (incl). Finally, it contains a relation acc
that is a set of accessor bits for this method. Each of the possible accessor types
(public, protected, ﬁnal, etc.) is encoded as a bit value in the Global signature. The
acc relation must be a set, of course, since a method may have more than one such
attribute.
The Clazz signature is used to describe the properties of a Java class. For the
purposes of the constraint checking that will be described below, it is suﬃcient to
assign each class a unique cordinal ordinal and also indicate the parent class of the
given class. The special signature JLO corresponds to the java.lang.Object class,
which is the root of the Java class hierarchy.
3.2 Execution Engine
The State signature represents the dynamic execution state. Its prog relation mod-
els the current instruction being executed; its meth relation models the current
method; its readers and writers relations model the current set of local variables
that have been read or written up to the current program point, respectively, and its
depth relation models the depth of the stack at the current program point. As the
execution engine processes the instruction initializers, it eﬀectively creates new State
atoms representing the execution state after the eﬀects of the current instruction
have been applied.
The execution engine contains the Alloy code associated with State initialization,
State sequencing, and execution termination. State initialization code is ﬁxed within
the model template. The State initialization code creates an initial state s0,s e t s
the readers and writers relations of s0 to be empty, sets the depth relation of s0
to be 0, and sets the prog relation of s0 to be the special startup instruction. Note
that here is no actual JVM instruction named startup. However, when the JVM
invokes a method it performs certain very speciﬁc startup actions (the method
prologue) before the ﬁrst instruction of that method is executed. The pseudo-
instruction startup captures these actions. Speciﬁcally, when the JVM enters an
instance method it will set the value of the local variable 0 to be Java’s this object;
if a class method is being called there is no this and so 0 is not used for that purpose.
If the method has arguments, these arguments are placed in local variables starting
at the ﬁrst unused index. Note also that the startup instruction will always have a
depth relation will be 0. Finally, the meth relation of s0 will be set to the special
method jthis. This method name is an alias for the method in which execution
begins. The initializer for the startup instruction must be generated by the classﬁle
parser. By convention, the startup instruction is located at a map value of −1, and
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has length 1.
State transitions and also execution termination are handled by an Alloy fact
known as stateTransition:
fact stateTransition {
all s: State - ord/last |
let s’ = ord/next[s] |
( some t: s.prog.term | t = 1 ) =>
sameState[s, s’] else
nextState[s, s’] }
The model of execution is that the nextState predicate is executed for each
nonterminal state. This predicate is responsible for updating the execution state
relations (readers, writers and depth) and advancing the instruction (and possibly
method) state. This predicate calls the nextInstruction predicate, which updates
the value of the current instruction and method for s’.I tu p d a t e st h ereader and
writer relations for the new state s’ by calling predicates that take the unions of
the corresponding r and w sets from the current instruction s.prog with the values
of readers and writers from the current state s, respectively. Finally, it updates
the depth relation for s’ by adding the smod value of the current instruction to the
depth in the current state s.
3.3 Security Constraints
The Alloy model template attempts to capture some of the high value JVM secu-
rity constraints checked by the Bytecode Veriﬁer. Thus we must now deﬁne what
constitutes a high value constraint. There are many avenues of attack that can be
used by malicious code. Common attack methods include the use of uninitialized
memory, accessing out-of-bounds memory, functional redirection (causing the code
to execute a method other than the one that was speciﬁed) and instruction redi-
rection (causing a transfer to control to any location other than the beginning of
a valid, in-scope instruction). In the JVM, these abstract attack methods can be
expressed in terms of concrete constraints, and from there can be written as Alloy
assertions. Speciﬁcally, it should never be possible to read a local variable that
has not been written; it should never be possible to access a local variable with an
index less than zero or greater than the frame length of the current method. The
ﬁrst case would correspond to accessing uninitialized memory, while the second and
third cases would correspond to accessing out-of-bounds memory. The following
Alloy assertions are used to verify these constraints:
assert LocalVar { all s: State | s.readers in s.writers }
assert rInRangelow { all s: State, u: s.readers | gte[u, 0] }
assert rInRangehigh { all s: State, u: s.readers |
lte[u, s.meth.framelen] }
assert wInRangelow { all s: State, u: s.writers | gte[u, 0] }
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assert wInRangehigh { all s: State, u: s.writers |
lte[u, s.meth.framelen] }
It is straightforward to interpret these constraints. The LocalVar constraint, for
example, says that for all States, the set of local variables read must be a subset
of the set of local variables written. The rInRangelow constraint says that for all
states and for all local variables indices in the readers relation of that state, it must
be the case that each index is greater than or equal to 0. (Of course if the LocalVar
constraint is satisﬁed the subsequent constraints on the readers are subsumed in
the corresponding constraints on the writers.)
It should also be possible to make similar assertions about the stack. In the
JVM the stack is not used to carry method arguments or return values, so that
stack is, in fact, purely local to a method. It must always be the case that the
depth of the stack is non-negative. Further, it must always be the case that the
stack depth at any program point is invariant, regardless of how that program point
is reached. The notorious BlackBox applet, for example, violates this latter stack
depth invariance constraint as part of its exploitation methodology. These two stack
constraints can be expressed in Alloy as:
assert StackGTE { all s: State | gte[s.depth, 0] }
assert StackDepth {
all s, s’ : State | (s.prog.map = s’.prog.map) =>
(s.depth = s’.depth) }
Instruction transfer constraints insure that when the program ﬂow of control
is changed by the execution of a conditional or unconditional branch, the program
counter is changed to a byte oﬀset that matches the beginning of an instruction. If a
transfer could be arranged into the middle of an instruction, or into uninitialized or
out-of-bounds memory, then arbitrary code could be executable. This is a security
defect that is often exploitable. In the current model of an Instruction there are
three possible branching relations: ubt, jsr and cbt.N o t e t h a t ubt and cbt name
absolute oﬀsets, while jsr names a relative oﬀset. We must therefore write Alloy
constraints that insure that the computed target locations correspond to the byte
oﬀset of exactly one Instruction. These constraints are written as follows:
assert InstructionTransfer_abs {
all ins : Instruction, u: ins.ubt |
one bti: Instruction { bti.map = u } }
assert InstructionTransfer_cabs {
all ins : Instruction, c: ins.cbt |
one bti: Instruction { bti.map = c } }
assert InstructionTransfer_rel {
all ins : Instruction, u: ins.jsr |
one bti: Instruction { bti.map = add[ins.map, u] } }
The ﬁnal set of high value constraints is associated with virtual method invo-
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cation. In Java virtual method invocation involves the execution of an instance
method in which the dispatch is based on the Java class that contains an actual
matching implementation of the method. In the JVM instruction set this is handled
by the invokevirtual instruction. The invokevirtual instruction takes a index into
the constant pool of the current class as its argument. The index must be a valid
index into the constant pool, and must refer to a fully qualiﬁed method. If the
method reference’s class contains a resolvable method of that name and signature,
or a compatible signature that can be reached by the usual rules of widening, box-
ing and unboxing, then the method lookup procedure terminates. If one or more of
these conditions is not realized, then the superclass of the method reference’s class
is consulted recursively until resolution terminates successfully; otherwise a Java
exception is raised. The resolved method must not be an initializer (constructor)
or a class initializer, and must not be static or abstract. Finally, if the method in
question has the protected attribute, it must be in the same class as the class con-
taining the method which called invokevirtual. Insuring that JVM bytecodes satisfy
all the stated constraints is critical for security. If invokevirtual can be coerced into
executing a method with inappropriate attributes, for example, this could lead to
the execution of arbitrary bytes, information disclosure (by virtue of exposing pri-
vate methods or variables) or denial of service (by causing a JVM crash through
the execution of non-viable code). We separate the constraint checking into two
separate Alloy assertions:
assert invokevirtual {
all i: Instruction, iv: i.iv | one m: Method {
m.cpindex = iv && m.acc - Globals.ACC_STATIC = m.acc &&
m.acc - Globals.ACC_ABSTRACT = m.acc &&
m.ordinal != init__.ordinal &&
m.ordinal != clinit__.ordinal } }
assert invokevirtual2 {
all i: Instruction, iv: i.iv | one m: Method {
(m.acc - Globals.ACC_PROTECTED != m.acc) =>
m.incl = i.inm.incl } }
The ﬁrst constraint asserts that for all Instructions, if the iv relation of that
instruction is non-empty, then there is exactly one Method such that the constant
pool index of that method is the same as the argument to the instruction (which
must, perforce, be the invokevirtual instruction), the acc accessor bitﬁeld of that
method contains neither the static attribute nor the abstract attribute, and the
ordinal for that method does not match the ordinal for an initializer or class initial-
izer. The second constraints covers the case of the protected attribute. It states
that if the matching method has the protected attribute, then the containing class
of the matching method must be the same as the containing class of the method
that contains the invokevirtual instruction being analyzed.
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3.4 Class2Alloy Classﬁle Parser
The model template is not a complete Alloy model in that it does not encode any
property information of actual JVM instructions, methods or classes. That encod-
ing is handled by the relation initializers, which must initialize all the instruction,
method and class relations based on the bytecodes of a speciﬁed methods. The
initialization must also handle the creation of concrete signatures that extend the
abstract Instruction, Method and Clazz signatures. These concrete signatures are
based on exactly those instructions that are in the speciﬁed methods, their contain-
ing classes, and the class ancestors of those containing classes.
A classﬁle parser, known as Class2Alloy, was written to generate these Alloy re-
lation initializers given a Java classﬁle and also a list of method names. Class2Alloy
was implemented in Java using the Byte Code Engineering Library, BCEL [12].
BCEL is an extremely powerful classﬁle analysis library that provides ready access
to the instruction stream in Java classes. BCEL makes it straightforward to extract
the requisite properties for each instruction, method or class under consideration.
Class2Alloy is implemented in two Java ﬁles, Class2Alloy.java and AlloyS-
tring.java. Class2Alloy.java contains the main analysis routines, while AlloyS-
tring.java is a utility class that handles the speciﬁc Alloy syntax needed to generate
syntactically correct relation initializers. The operation of the parser is as follows.
The main method receives three arguments: the name of a classﬁle, which must be
in the classpath, a list of method names, and the name of an output ﬁle. The main
method creates a Class2Alloy instance; the Class2Alloy constructor creates a set
of empty AlloyStrings, one for each relation to be initialized, along with an empty
AlloyString that will hold the signature information. BCEL is then used to load
the classﬁle, enumerate its methods, and search for the named methods in the array
of methods; on success an array of BCEL Method objects is obtained. Class2Alloy
then parses these Method objects to obtain a list of instructions contained within
the methods. For each instruction, it then queries that instruction for those prop-
erties that need to be initialized in the Alloy model, namely its byte oﬀset from the
beginning of the method, its byte length, the sets of local variables that it reads or
writes, the set of possible conditional or unconditional branches that it can take,
and also the number of bytes that it adds or removes from the stack. If an invoke-
virtual instruction is encountered, a method lookup is performed on the constant
pool index it names. This may cause other classﬁles to be loaded recursively in
order to obtain the properties for the referenced methods and classes. Once the
instruction analysis is complete, each AlloyString prints itself to the output ﬁle.
The AlloyString class handles the details of generating syntactically correct Alloy
output for each of the relation initializers, as well as generating the appropriate
extension signatures for each instruction, method and class being analyzed.
Once this output ﬁle is combined with the model template, a complete model
specialized for the methods under analysis is obtained. The Alloy analyzer is then
run on that model, and each of the constraint assertions is invoked to determine
the presence of counterexamples. Any counterexample represents a violation of
one or more constraints. Any constraint violation is an indication of insecure, and
potentially exploitable, JVM bytecodes. The approach in question has been tested
extensive and produces no false positives. In addition, when run against known ma-
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licious applets, such as the BlackBox applet, counterexamples are detected. Several
malicious applets were synthesized to illustrate invalid memory accesses, instruction
diversion and function diversion. All were detected.
4 Future Work
There are several areas in which the JVM security analysis approach described
in this paper can be extended and improved. The most obvious, and certainly
the most important, is to add constraint checking for additional constraints. The
opcode argument constraint, which states that each JVM instruction is invoked with
the correct number of type conforming arguments, is of particular importance. The
JVM instruction set contains three other instructions involved in method invocation,
namely invokestatic, invokespecial and invokeinterface. The constraint checking
shown above for invokevirtual should be extended to handle these instructions as
well.
The current model does not completely handle exceptions. In particular, only a
single exception block per method is currently modeled, while actual bytecode can
employ multiple (nested) exception blocks. Adding full exception handling to the
model has high priority. This is an ongoing area of research.
Finally, the JVM is not the only bytecode interpreted language that could be
subjected to this form of security analysis. CIL and Flash are obvious candidates
for constraint based model checking for security purposes.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has demonstrated that Alloy is an extremely powerful tool for performing
security constraint analysis on Java bytecodes. Even at this stage of development,
meaningful results have been obtained. Extensions to this work are ongoing, with
the goal of increasing the scope of constraint checking and further reﬁning and
improving the analysis process. Extensions to other languages are also in work.
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